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Abstract: Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are deter-
mined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a
theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain
how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to in -
vestigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through em-
pirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and non-at-
tentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in
this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In
this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each
plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts.
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I – Introduction
A visual perception of a particular object in our external environment puts us in
a position to engage in a series of cognitive activities in relation to that object. We can
identify the object to a hearer with an ostensive act or a demonstrative expression, we
can plan a course of action in relation to it, image what it would look like from a differ-
ent spatial perspective, speculate about its hidden properties and dispositional behaviors,
estimate whether it would fit in the space between two other objects, wonder whether it
is the same object we have previously encountered on other occasions, and so on.
Thoughts and other cognitive activities directed at particular objects in the world
are called  “demonstrative thoughts”. The most obvious reason for this terminology is
that such thoughts can be linguistically articulated with a demonstrative expression such
1 This research is funded in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível
Superior – Brasil (Capes) - Finance Code 001. I would like to thank Ernesto Perini, Eduarda
Calado, Carlos Barth, Samuel Maia and Francisco Lages for comments on an earlier draft that
led to this article. 
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as ‘this’ or ‘that’, as a way of identifying the object to a hearer, or to internally articulate
an inferential reasoning involving the object (“if this is 30cm in length, and that is 45cm
in length,  then this  will  fit  inside of that”).  But, more importantly,  this  terminology
highlights an important metasemantic question: the singular content of these thoughts is
determined “demonstratively”, i.e., through a perceptual relation that is unmediated by
concepts and does not depend on the attribution of descriptive material to the referent. It
is because demonstrative thoughts reveal this direct connection between subject and ob-
ject that they have been deemed philosophically interesting.2
That is to say, although I can refer to a perceived object with a conceptually
complex demonstrative such as “that chair” or “that fig tree on top of the tallest moun-
tain seen in the northern direction”, philosophers generally agree that there is a form of
reference that is more simple and direct, something that visual perception makes possi-
ble, even in situations where I am not in a position to attribute conceptual material to the
object my thought concerns.3 If I visually perceive a flying object in the sky, I can think,
through t1 to t3, “that’s a bird…that’s a plane…that’s superman”,4 and still manage to
single out a particular object in thought from t1 to t3, even if I am wrong in my concep-
tual attributions. This shows that the reference of demonstrative thoughts is not deter-
mined in a descriptive manner through conceptual material associated with the object,
but by the very fact of my being perceptually related to it, a relation which allows me to
visually select the object in my perceptual experience.
On the basis of these observations, philosophers have sought to elucidate the na-
ture of the perceptual relation that puts in a direct (i.e., conceptually unmediated) rela-
tion with objects in the world, and which determines the singular content of demonstra-
tive thoughts. In this picture, the “metasemantic problem” of demonstrative thought is
to elucidate how certain facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts
come to have the singular contents that they do.
According to Campbell (1997, pp. 56-58), the fundamental problem to be solved
in this respect is to explain how the propositional content of a demonstrative thought
2 Philosophical investigations about demonstrative thoughts have their origins in Strawson’s
work on demonstrative identification (1959) and Burge’s notion of de re belief (1977). But in its
current form, the terminology dates back to Peacocke (1981) and Evans (1982). More recent no-
tions  of  demonstrative  thoughts,  closer  to  cognitive  psychology,  can be found in Campbell
(2002), Levine (2010), Wu (2011), and Stazicker (2011). For a critical discussion of these latter
views see De Carvalho 2016.
3 Strawson (1959), Burge (1977), Bach (1987), Smith (2002).
4 The example comes from Kahneman et al. (1992).
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can select an object in an iconic perceptual representation, when both have very differ-
ent structural properties. Campbell’s solution consists in positing conscious attention as
the mechanism responsible for selecting objects in an iconic representation of the visual
scene, so that this object may be further processed by the agent’s cognitive system.
However,  the  metasemantic  problem  of  demonstrative  thoughts  isn’t  fully
solved by elucidating how propositional mental contents combine with iconic perceptual
contents. After all, even if we manage to show how both kinds of content can interact,
all we’ve done was connect one kind of mental content with another; but we still leave
open how, in turn, the iconic content of perception connects to particular objects in the
world, which are the referents of our demonstrative thoughts. If we don’t want the same
problem to arise at every level of analysis by positing further and further levels of con-
tent, at some point the world must impose itself onto our perceptual systems in a purely
bottom-up manner. In this respect, solving the metasemantic problem of demonstrative
thoughts is connected to to the task of explaining the intentionality of thought via visual
perception.
On the basis  of these considerations,  it  has become commonplace  to borrow
from cognitive psychology empirical models of object perception, which are supposed
to bear the theoretical burden of explaining how objects can be visually selected in the
world in a non-conceptual and bottom-up manner. These mechanisms would be respon-
sible for establishing the fundamental perceptual relation that puts us in contact with ex-
ternal objects, explaining how demonstrative thoughts based on this perceptual relation
come to have the singular contents that they do.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help
us  solve  the  metasemantic  problem,  through empirical  models  of  visual  processing.
With the advance of our scientific knowledge about the visual system, this approach has
become increasingly popular in the philosophy of language and mind, so that an expla-
nation of how the mind, through visual perception, connects to the world, acquires sci-
entific status by being grounded on perceptual mechanisms of object representation. In
this picture, we resort to the empirical sciences in order to complement philosophical
explanations of the intentionality of thought, and, simultaneously, to help us solve the
metasemantic problem of demonstrative thoughts.
The structure of the paper is the following: in the next section I will introduce
two theoretical constraints that a perceptual mechanism must meet, in order to be con-
sidered  a  direct  and  non-conceptual  metasemantic  mechanism  for  demonstrative
3
thoughts. Section III will examine a first candidate, based on Pylyshyn’s FINST hypoth-
esis  (2007),  incorporated  into  a  philosophical  theory  of  demonstrative  thoughts  by
Joseph Levine (2010). Once this mechanism is discarded due to lack of scientific evi-
dence,  section IV will  examine another candidate,  namely,  object  segmentation pro-
cesses  (Rensink  2000,  Lamme  2003),  incorporated  into  a  philosophical  theory  of
demonstrative thoughts by Athanassios Raftopoulos (2009a,b). The output representa-
tions of this mechanism, however, will be too unstable and short-lived, requiring atten-
tion in order to be able to refer successfully to objects in the world. But if that is true, it
seems that the resulting mechanism fails to meet the theoretical constraints of section II.
Section V will propose a solution to this problem, by reformulating both theoret-
ical constraints in a way that gives us more space of maneuver without losing sight of
their main motivation. On the basis of this new formulation, section VI will present a
hybrid  mechanism  composed  of  both  attentional  and  non-attentional  elements,  and
make  precise  the  role  of  each  in  determining  the  singular  content  of  demonstrative
thoughts, as well as sketch some final considerations.
II – Two theoretical constraints
If we will borrow from cognitive psychology perceptual mechanisms of object
representation to help us solve the metasemantic problem, there are some conditions
such  mechanisms  must  conform  to.  In  order  to  clarify  this  point,  we  can  borrow
Levine’s distinction between direct metasemantic mechanisms, or DMM’s, and inten-
tionally mediated mechanisms, or IMM’s (2010, pp. 173-75). IMM’s are mechanisms
that  select  their  referents  through  the  semantic  content  of  other  representations.  A
paradigmatic example would be a descriptive name like Evans’ ‘Julius’, stipulated to re-
fer to “the inventor of the zipper, whoever he is (Evans, 1982, p. 31). DMM’s, on the
contrary, select their referents directly, by which Levine means with no representational
intermediaries (2010, p. 174). The first condition, therefore, concerns the absence of
representational intermediaries in the way these mechanisms select their objects. Ap-
plied to object representation systems, the first constraint can be formulated in the fol-
lowing manner:
• DIRECT: any putative perceptual mechanism must yield as output the lowest repre-
sentational level where objects are represented in the visual system
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In addition,  we’ve seen that  these mechanisms must select  their  objects  in a
purely bottom-up manner, independent of the application of concepts. On the basis of
these considerations,  Raftopoulos  argues  that  a  second constraint  can be formulated
along the following lines (2009a, p. 340):
• NON-CONCEPTUAL: any putative perceptual mechanism must be cognitively im-
penetrable,  i.e.,  instantiated by a modular system encapsulated from higher cogni-
tion.5
On the basis of these two conditions, some mechanisms that have been proposed
in the literature may be immediately discarded. According to a popular theory devel-
oped by Joseph Campbell (1997/2002), the fundamental perceptual relation that puts us
in a direct contact with external objects is an attentional relation. Campbell finds empiri-
cal support for this view in Treisman and Gelade’s Feature Integration Theory of atten-
tion (1980), according to which attention serves as the “glue” that binds various sensory
features (such as color or orientation) as features of one and the same object, when at-
tention is consciously allocated to the location occupied by the object. This attentional
relation supposedly yields as output the lowest representational level where objects are
represented in the visual system, since attention is what makes object representation
possible in the first place.
However, it  seems that this attentional model does not meet these theoretical
constraints. First of all, there is evidence that attention is directed primarily to objects,
not locations. These objects are supposed to be pre-attentively represented, and attention
is directed to these pre-attentive representations. If this is true, attentional processes can-
not yield as output the lowest representational level where objects are represented in the
visual system, violating DIRECT above.
Important evidence in this respect comes from the work of Steven Yantis and
collaborators, which seeks to explain the automatic capture of attention by sudden ob-
ject onsets. Yantis considers two hypothesis as to why this happens (1998): perhaps
low-level visual processes detect changes in sensory features like luminance, brightness,
color or movement in certain locations of the visual field where an object suddenly ap-
pears, which causes attention to be automatically drawn to that location. Or, alterna-
tively, as soon as a new object appears in the scene, a pre-attentive representation may
5 The term “cognitive impenetrability” comes from Pylyshyn (1999).
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be automatically created for that object, which would prompt the visual system to auto-
matically direct attention to this object in order to extract more information from it.
What would make us decide one way or another? If the sudden appearance of an
object is not accompanied by any changes in luminance, brightness, color or movement,
but still causes an automatic attentional capture, it would be a good indication that atten-
tion is primarily directed at objects, and not locations where certain changes in sensory
features are detected. Yantis & Jonides (1984), Yantis & Hillstrom (1994) and Yantis
(1998) tested this hypothesis controlling and keeping constant various features such as
luminance,  brightness, color and movement,  whenever a new object appeared in the
scene. Even under these conditions, the sudden onset of a new object always captured
attention in an automatic manner. Yantis’ final conclusion is that attention must be di-
rected to pre-attentive object representations,  which would eliminate attention as the
metasemantic mechanism we are looking for, since it violates DIRECT above (Yantis,
1998, p. 251).
In addition,  there is evidence that  attention is not a cognitively impenetrable
process. Based on electrophysiological recordings and fMRI studies conducted by Vic-
tor Lamme (2003), Raftopoulos argues that the effects of attention are first registered at
200ms after stimulus onset, at a temporal scale where there is already significant inter-
actions between the visual system and higher cognitive centers in the brain (2009b). At-
tention, in this picture, serves to integrate pre-attentive representations into the whole
cognitive context of the agent, which violates NON-CONCEPTUAL above.
Both  DIRECT and NON-CONCEPTUAL are  reasonable  constraints,  as  they
help restrict putative perceptual mechanisms of object representation to direct and non-
conceptual metasemantic mechanisms. Although these constraints will be further clari-
fied in section V, they will be provisionally accepted as formulated in this section, and
will be used to evaluate putative models of object perception throughout this paper. As
an alternative to attentional models, in the next two sections I will present two non-at-
tentional  models that  have been proposed by philosophers as possible metasemantic
mechanisms for demonstrative thoughts, and critically examine them in relation to the
theoretical constraints established in this section.
III – The FINST model
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The  first  model  to  be  examined  will  be  Pylyshyn’s  visual  index  system,  or
FINST’s6, posited as a mechanism of object selection in the cognitively encapsulated
early vision system7,  which automatically  “captures” objects  in the world through a
brute causal relation with no representational intermediaries. This definition makes it an
excellent candidate for a direct, non-conceptual metasemantic mechanism, according to
the theoretical constraints of section II.
According to Pylyshyn’s hypothesis, the FINST system was shaped by evolu-
tionary pressures to be causally sensitive to certain clusters of properties in the world,
for these clusters tend to correspond, in the kind of world where our visual system has
evolved, to ordinary material objects. As a result, whenever we are confronted with a
visual scene, particular objects in the world will “grab” up to four visual indices (which
is the maximum number of indices  available)  automatically  and simultaneously,  en-
abling the visual system to individuate and keep track of these objects independently of
attention (Pylyshyn, 2001, 2007). The most important evidence in favor of FINST’s
comes  from  the  Multiple  Object  Tracking  (MOT)  experimental  paradigm.  For  if
Pylyshyn’s hypothesis is correct and the visual system has its own means of individuat-
ing and tracking up to four objects independently of attention, it predicts that something
like multiple object tracking should be possible, even in conditions where attention can-
not be directed to each item to be tracked.
In a typical MOT experiment, the goal is to track four targets as they move ran-
domly among qualitatively identical distractors. The experiment begins as the four tar-
gets are identified by a cue (such as blinking on and off), and then move across the
screen amidst a number of distractors. At the end of experiment all objects come to a
stop and one of them is randomly identified, and the subject is supposed to say if this
object is a target or a distractor.8 This experiment has been widely replicated in many
laboratories, and results indicate a high success rate of 85% on average, which invali-
dates an explanation in terms of random selection of targets at the end of the experiment
6 FINST's stand for “FingersFINgers ontiation”,  in order to capture Pylyshyn’s imaginative
analogy with the superhero “Plastic Man”, who can stick his fingers on particular objects as
they move around him, affording him means to refer to the objects on the tips of his fingers
without having to attend to each of these objects (Pylyshyn, 2007, pp. 13-14).
7 The early vision system is functionally defined by Pylyshyn as the part of the visual system
that is encapsulated from the remainder of cognition (1999). Raftopoulos proposes a definition
of this system in terms of its temporal properties (2009b), as the processing that occurs up until
150ms after stimulus onset, when processing is still restricted to visual areas (see section IV).
8 The reader is invited to try an online version of the experiment at: http://perception.yale.edu/
Brian/demos/MOT-Basics.html
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(Pylyshyn,  2007,  p.  36).  With  five  targets,  however,  performance  drops  drastically,
which corroborates Pylyshyn’s hypothesis about the set-size limitations of this mecha-
nism.
On  the  basis  of  this  model,  Joseph  Levine  develops  a  mental  semantic  for
demonstrative  thoughts  with  a  representational  hierarchy structured  into  three  levels
(2010). On the top level we find mental demonstratives such as ‘this’, whose content is
a “mental  pointer” that  points to an underlying perceptual  representation.  But rather
than pointing directly to visual indices, it points to an attentional representation – the in-
termediary level – where only one object is visually selected in experience. Attentional
processes, in turn, select one of the four available visual indices in the lower level pre-
attentive representation, which are captured in an automatic, direct and non-conceptual
manner by objects in the world. The reference of mental demonstratives, in this model,
is determined by the visual index captured by an external object, but in order for one to
be able to think of this object, attention must be drawn to it. Levine’s theoretical model
can be captured in the following figure:
(Figure 1)
Although at first sight the FINST model seems like an excellent candidate for a
direct and cognitively impenetrable metasemantic mechanism, when we look at other
evidence and other explanations for these experimental results, the appeal of the model
weakens significantly. As we shall see, the same results may be equally explained by
more parsimonious attentional models, based on well-established scientific facts about
the benefits of attention and the limits of working memory. This evidence raises serious
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problems not only for the pre-attentive status of the FINST mechanism, but for its very
relevance to a philosophical theory of demonstrative thoughts. 
Pylyshyn’s main reason for characterizing FINST’s as a pre-attentive mecha-
nism is that an attentional mechanism could not possibly explain the high success rate of
85% observed in MOT experiments. For suppose a subject must direct her attention to
each target to be tracked in a serial manner, so as to encode its location; then, as targets
move among distractors, the subject must quickly revisit each encoded location, shift at-
tention to the object immediately adjacent to it, update the encoded location, and so on
successively for each target to be tracked. Computer simulations have showed that even
with very conservative estimates on the timescales of these attentional shifts, the suc-
cess rate of this strategy would not surpass 30% (Pylyshyn, 2007, pp. 36-37).
This argument, however, presupposes a spotlight model of attention (Posner et
al. 1980), where attention moves like a spotlight that scans the visual scene in a serial
manner. But there are other models where attention does not work like a single spotlight
but can be divided among multiple foci. In an adaptation of Posner’s classical spatial
cueing paradigm, Awh and Pashler have shown that cues simultaneously presented in
multiple regions of the visual field yielded benefits for all these regions, but not for in-
termediary  regions  (2000).  These  results  cannot  be  explained  in  a  spotlight  model,
which would predict  attentional  benefits  in  intermediary  regions  as attention  moved
from one cued location to another.
On the basis of these observations, we can propose an alternative explanation for
MOT based on multifocal attention. In Cavanagh and Alvarez’s model (2005), for ex-
ample, targets are simultaneously tracked by independent foci of attention, guided by a
control process that keeps selection centered over the targets as they move across the
screen. This process is supplemented by an encoding stream transmitting target informa-
tion to higher cognitive processes, which control verbal reports at the end of the task. In
this model, the set-size limitation of four items observed in MOT tasks is not explained
by the number of available visual indices, but by working memory limitations, which
can only deal efficiently with an average of four items at a time.9
Finally, there is a curious fact about MOT that seems to be a problem for the
FINST model. As we have seen, at the end of a MOT task it is possible to distinguish a
target from a distractor in a very efficient manner, with a success rate of 85% on aver-
9 Kahneman et al. (1992).
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age. However, it is extremely difficult to indicate which particular target that is, among
the four indicated. That is to say, if we mentally label each target to be tracked with the
letters A, B, C and D, at the end of the task we would know if a given object is a target
or a distractor, but we would be unable to indicate whether it is target A, B, C, or D, or
whether “this target” (identified in the beginning of the task) is identical to “this target”
(identified at the end of the task).10
But if the high success rate of MOT tasks is explained by the automatic capture
of visual indices by each object to be tracked, this shouldn’t happen. After all, one of
the main motivations for positing visual indices is to give the visual system the means to
individuate and track objects in an automatic manner, where each object is individuated
by a numerically distinct visual index. It is precisely for this reason that Pylyshyn com-
pares his visual indices to “fingers” that point to particular objects, as in the analogy
with “Plastic Man”:  
It seemed to me that the superhero (…) had what we needed to solve the identity-
tracking or reidentification problem. Plastic Man would have been able to place a fin-
ger on each of the salient objects (…). Then no matter where he focused his attention
he would have a way to refer to the individual parts (…) so long as he kept one of his
fingers on it. Even if we assume that he could not detect any information with his fin-
ger tips, Plastic Man would still be able to think ‘‘this finger’’ and ‘‘that finger’’ and
thus be able to refer to individual things that his fingers were touching. (Pylyshyn,
2007, p. 13)
But if Plastic Man is simultaneously tracking an object with his index finger and
another with his ring finger, he should have no problem distinguishing, at the end of the
tracking period, one object from another; each finger, in Pylyshyn’s metaphor, provides
a unique address for each target to be tracked, which should provide means for the su-
perhero to distinguish “this object” (on the tip of his index finger) as distinct from “that
object” (on the tip of his ring finger). But, on the contrary, it seems that this mechanism
is systematically confusing targets for one another. It is still possible to maintain the
identity of the targets as a whole, but not the identity of individual targets. 
These observations weaken considerably the motivation for positing visual in-
dices in the first place. A more apt analogy would be a “closed hand”, which “holds” the
targets to be tracked, distinguishing them from other objects outside the hand, but con-
cealing individuating information about targets inside the closed hand. This is exactly
10 This curious fact was first noticed by Scholl (2009).
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what Rensink proposes with his coherence theory of attention (2000), where attention
works like a hand that holds up to four visual units, allowing a subject to track them as
they move across the visual scene. Rensink even suggests that the term FINST (fingers
of instantiation) should be replaced by HANST (hand of instantiation), which describes
in a more appropriate manner how attention is focused on the targets as a set (Rensink,
2000, p. 27). 
On the basis of these observations, it is reasonable to suppose that a multi-focal
attentional model, or a coherence theory of attention, explain the same data from MOT
as the FINST model, while explaining further facts that the latter has trouble accommo-
dating. In addition, these attentional models are more parsimonious, as they are based
on well-established scientific facts about the benefits of attention and the limitations of
working memory, rather than positing a pre-attentive mechanism for which we have no
other independent evidence. This leads us to conclude that the main evidence in favor of
the FINST model, obtained through MOT tasks, does not favor the existence of a pre-at-
tentive metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts.
Of course, this does not mean that such a mechanism does not exist. After all,
even if these attentional models are correct, we still need to explain how attention is si-
multaneously directed to objects, and not regions of the visual field (as suggested by
Yantis and collaborators). Some pre-attentive mechanism must be responsible for pars-
ing the visual scene into discrete units, to which attention may be allocated. There is
empirical evidence, for example, that the visual system amodally completes partially oc-
cluded objects during the very first stages of perceptual processing, before the allocation
of attention.
Take, for example, the two images represented in figure 2 below. If the goal is to
find the notched “pac man” shape among the other shapes, this can be done effortlessly
and easily in image B, no matter how many additional shapes are added to the image (a
feature mark of automatic and parallel processing). The visual search in figure A, how-
ever, is slower, requiring one to serially attend to each item until the notched figure is
found. Search time also increases progressively with the amount of shapes added to the
image, which is a feature mark of a serial attentional process (Driver et al., 2001).
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(Figure 2)
This leads us to conclude that the visual field over which attention roams already
contains amodally completed objects. This explains the difficulty in finding the notched
shape in image A, since the shape is already represented pre-attentively as a full circle.
What this evidence reveals, however, is not a pre-attentive FINST mechanism, but low-
level processes of object segmentation, responsible for organizing the initial visual input
into discrete units before the allocation of attention. Even Pylyshyn is ready to admit
that the assignment of visual indices would presuppose object segmentation processes,
as can be seen in the following passage:
In assigning indexes, some cluster of visual features must first be segregated from the
background or picked out as a unit (…). Until some part of the visual field is segre -
gated in this way, no visual operation can be applied to it since it does not exist as
something distinct from the entire field. (Pylyshyn, 2001, p. 145)
To conclude this section, visual indices cannot be the perceptual metasemantic
mechanism we are looking for in a theory of demonstrative thoughts. If we want to find
support in cognitive psychology for a direct and non-conceptual metasemantic mecha-
nism, we must look to an even earlier level of perceptual processing, where segmenta-
tion processes parse the visual scene into discrete units in a purely bottom-up manner.
This is precisely Raftopoulos’ proposal, which will be examined in the next section.
IV – Segmentation process and proto-objects
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We’ve seen in section II that according to the NON-CONCEPTUAL constraint,
any putative mechanism must select objects in the world in a purely bottom-up manner.
According to Raftopoulos (2009a,b), such a mechanism can be found in object segmen-
tation processes. In order to show that this mechanism satisfies the NON-CONCEP-
TUAL constraint, Raftopoulos presents evidence of a level of visual processing that is
unaffected by top-down signals from higher cognitive centers in the brain. This evi-
dence comes from the work of Victor Lamme (2003), obtained through electrophysio-
logical recordings and fMRI studies, which show that up until 150ms after stimulus on-
set, information processing is restricted to visual areas. 
On the basis of this evidence, Raftopoulos defines ‘perception’ properly speak-
ing as the kind of processing that occurs at this timescale, and identifies the representa-
tional content of perception with neural states in the early vision system during this in-
terval  (Raftopoulos  2009a,  p.  341).  In  this  picture,  questions  about  the  content  and
structure of perception become purely empirical questions, to be resolved by cognitive
science. Only scientific investigation will tell us what these neural states are sensitive to
and what they encode, before the modulatory effects of higher cognition reach percep-
tual processing.
Evidence from Lamme (2003) and Rensink (2000) shows that neural popula-
tions in the early vision system, at temporal scales up until 150ms after stimulus onset,
encode a structural representation of the scene where particular objects – or proto-ob-
jects11 – are segregated from the background and represented as discrete visual units.
This evidence allows Raftopoulos to include objects in the content of perception, and to
put forward the processes responsible for representing objects in this manner – object
segmentation processes – as a direct and non-conceptual metasemantic mechanism for
demonstrative thoughts.
In Lamme’s model of visual processing, which Raftopoulos presupposes in his
theory, there are three processing stages, distinguished by temporal properties: the feed-
forward sweep (FFS), local recurrent processing (LRP) and global recurrent processing
(GRP). The FFS begins at 40ms after stimulus onset, when the first patterns of activa-
tion are registered in V1, and lasts until 100-120ms with the activation of most visual
areas in the dorsal and ventral streams. As the name indicates, neural activity at this
level moves only forward, never laterally or backwards. There is very little perceptual
organization at this point, and no segregation between figure and background. Some
11 The nature of these proto-objects will be discussed shortly.
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sensory properties are detected, but not attributed to particular visual elements. Stimuli
at this temporal scale are not consciously perceived (Lamme, 2003, pp. 14-15).
The first signs of recurrent processing (LRP) are registered only at 100-150ms
after stimulus onset, when lateral and feedback connections are established in the same
visual areas activated during the FFS, strengthening the connections between different
neural populations that represent various sensory properties. According to Lamme, a
perceptual  representation during the LRP consists in  “tentatively bound features and
surfaces” (2003, p. 17), which may be overridden or strengthened by subsequent atten-
tional  processes. When visual information reaches areas of executive and mnemonic
control (i.e., frontal, prefrontal and temporal cortices), at about 200ms after stimulus on-
set, this information is inserted into the overall cognitive context of the agent, becoming
integrated with plans, beliefs, intentions, background knowledge, etc. This is the level
of global recurrent processing (GRP), where the effects of attention are first registered.
More importantly for Raftopoulos’ proposal, information processing during the
LRP is still restricted to the visual system, and therefore cognitively impenetrable. But
as long as discrete visual units, which correspond to particular objects in the world, are
represented by populations of neurons during the LRP, as the outputs of object segmen-
tation  processes,  this  process  qualifies  as  a  direct  and non-conceptual  metasemantic
mechanism for demonstrative thoughts. As recurrent processing for Lamme is the neural
correlate of consciousness, at this level of processing the perceptual representation is al-
ready conscious,  although in  a  format  that  is  iconic,  short-lived,  and not  easily  re-
portable (Lamme, 2003, p. 16). To borrow a distinction from Ned Block (1995), we
would have phenomenal consciousness of this representation, but not access conscious-
ness,  which  requires  attention  and  global  recurrent  processing.  As  Raftopoulos  and
Müller put it:
We argue that causal chains relating the world with mental acts of perceptual demon-
stration single out the demonstrata and attach mental particulars to things. In a linguis-
tic context our claim is that these causal chains fix the reference of the perceptual
demonstratives in a nonconceptual and nondescriptive way. The causal relation is pro-
vided by the nonconceptual contents of perceptual states that are retrieved in bottom-
up ways from a visual scene by means of preattentional object-centered segmentation
processes (Raftopoulos & Müller, 2006, p. 253).
Although at first sight Raftopoulos’ model seems to satisfy both DIRECT and
NON-CONCEPTUAL constraints, a more careful examination will reveal some prob-
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lems regarding the first. The main problem, as we shall see, is that although the first
condition states that any putative mechanism must yield as output the lowest representa-
tional level where objects are represented in the visual system, in Raftopoulos’ model
the outputs of object segmentation processes are only proto-objects, and it is not clear
they can bear this theoretical burden.
Raftopoulos’ notion of proto-object comes from Rensink12, where they are de-
fined in the following terms:
1. Proto-objects are the highest-level outputs of low-level vision;
2. Proto-objects are the lowest level operands upon which attentional processes
act (Rensink, 2000, p. 22).
In Rensink’s model, the function of low-level vision is to provide a “quick and
dirty” interpretation of the visual scene, a rough sketch that provides the basic “gist” of
the structure of the scene. In this rough structural sketch, visual units – or proto-objects
– are simultaneously represented, although at this point these representations are unsta-
ble and short-lived. The function of attention in Rensink’s model is to endow these un-
stable representations with greater spatiotemporal coherence. Attention, as we’ve briefly
seen in section III, works like a “hand" that “holds” a small number of proto-objects –
around four – in order to form a “coherence field” around them, a more stable represen-
tational structure that persists as long as attention is sustained over these items, allowing
them to enter visual short-term memory. Once attention is disengaged, the coherence
field dissolves into its unstable constituents (the proto-objects).
So far this model is compatible with Lamme’s, where pre-attentive processing
during the FFS and the LRP provides a rough structural sketch of the visual scene con-
stituted by discrete visual units. Moreover, Rensink also agrees that we have only phe-
nomenal consciousness of this representation,  which is constantly regenerated as our
eyes  move  across  the  scene.  As  attention  for  Rensink  is  necessary  in  order  to  see
change13, we are not aware of the way this representation is in constant flux; we are only
phenomenally aware of the basic structural aspects of the scene, a virtual representation
that seems stable and constant to us but that is constantly dissolving and regenerating.
12 As Raftopoulos himself is ready to admit (2009b, p. 21).
13 One of the goals of Rensink’s coherence theory is to provide an explanation of inattentional
blindness, or the incapacity to perceive change when they occur outside the focus of attention.
(Rensink, 2000, p. 19).
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However  –  and  here  is  where  Raftopoulos’  model  runs  into  trouble  –  in
Rensink’s theory proto-objects have an extremely limited spatiotemporal coherence, de-
caying after a few hundred milliseconds or being immediately replaced whenever a new
stimulus appears in the same retinal location where a proto-object was previously de-
tected (Rensink, 2000, p. 20). Rensink’s main conclusion is that attention is required for
this representation to persist for more than a few hundred milliseconds (Rensink, 2000,
p. 23).
These observations strongly suggest that proto-objects cannot meet the DIRECT
constraint from section II. After all, if proto-object representations last no longer than a
single eye saccade of a few hundred milliseconds, and are immediately replaced by the
representation  of  another  proto-object  that  appears  in  the  same retinal  location,  this
mechanism cannot, on its own, pick out particular objects; it would constantly equivo-
cate  between  two  distinct  objects  that  appear  in  the  same  retinal  location,  and  it
wouldn’t be able to track a single object that moves from one adjacent location to an-
other. A perceptual representation of an object, at the very least, is something that per-
sists in time, allowing us to track the object in space during a period of observation, and
grounds our capacity to affirm that “this object” at position p1 and time t1 is the same as
“this object” at position p2 and time t2. Proto-objects do not meet this requirement, and
therefore these representations do not constitute the lowest representational level where
objects are represented in the visual system. We are thus led to conclude that object seg-
mentation processes cannot, on their own, solve the metasemantic problem of demon-
strative thoughts.
But if Rensink is right and attention is required to maintain the numerical iden-
tity of an object in time, then perhaps we should reconsider the outputs of attentional
processes as the lowest representational level where objects are first represented in the
visual system. But if this is the case, then we seem to have reached an impasse: on the
one hand, genuine object representations are only possible with attention. On the other
hand, attentional processes are not cognitively impenetrable according to evidence from
Victor Lamme (2003). How do we resolve this impasse?
A possible conclusion would be that none of the mechanisms examined so far
are capable of meeting both theoretical constraints at the same time, and therefore we
should seek further alternatives from cognitive psychology. This conclusion, however,
would be too hasty. In the next section I will argue that the observations put forward in
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this section point to a reformulation of both theoretical constraints from section II. Al-
though these are reasonable constraints that should not be abandoned, some distinctions
and clarifications are in order for the conflict to dissipate. This will be the main goal of
section V.
V – Two theoretical constraints, clarified and reformulated 
An important clarification concerning DIRECT was already introduced in sec-
tion IV. As we’ve seen, it is not enough for a structural representation of a visual scene
to contain discrete perceptual items; these representations also need to persist in time as
the agent and object move in space, under the risk of continuous referential equivoca-
tion. Therefore, when we ask cognitive psychology how objects are represented in the
visual system, there are two different things we want to know:
1. Individuation: how are visual units segregated from the background and from
one another in a visual array?
2. Maintenance of  numerical  identity:  how can representations  of  these  visual
units persist in time, through successive movements of the object and the sensory
organ during a period of observation, so that the object’s numerical identity is
maintained?
The second question naturally presupposes the first, since an object needs to be
segregated and discriminated from the background before the representation can persist
in time. Therefore, when we say that a mechanism of object representation should not
be representationally  mediated,  we are talking about the individuation question.  The
moment when external objects first impose themselves onto the visual system is when
the visual system is able to spatially differentiate them from one another in a structural
representation of the visual scene. This mechanism must in fact be unmediated by other
representations, if we want to connect mind and world through visual perception.
However, this is not yet the lowest representational level where we find object
representations in the visual system, since these representations still lack a minimal spa-
tiotemporal coherence to be able to refer to objects properly speaking. The DIRECT
theoretical constraint can therefore be distinguished into two sub-conditions, each con-
cerning one aspect of object representation:
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• DIRECT  i: Mechanisms of  individuation must be direct,  i.e.,  with no representa-
tional intermediaries;
• DIRECT  m:  Mechanisms responsible  for the  maintenance of numerical  identity
must yield as output the lowest representational level where objects are represented in
the visual system.
These observations point to a hybrid metasemantic mechanism for demonstra-
tive thoughts, combining both attentional and pre-attentive elements in each sub-condi-
tion specified above. It is important to notice, however, that not any attentional or pre-
attentive model can be used as part of this hybrid mechanism. We could not find con-
vincing evidence for Pylyshyn’s FINST model, for example, since the main evidence in
its favor could be explained by more parsimonious attentional models, that are also able
to explain other  phenomena that  the FINST model  has  trouble  accommodating.  We
were, however, able to find good evidence for pre-attentive processes of object segmen-
tation, responsible for individuating perceptual units (proto-objects) in a visual array in
a purely bottom-up manner. These processes will be presupposed as mechanisms of in-
dividuation.
Similarly,  Campbell’s  attentional  model,  briefly  discussed in section II,  must
also be discarded, since in this model attention is directed to locations, so that the vari-
ous sensory features detected at that location can be bound together as properties of a
single object. This model, and the empirical theory it presupposes, does not conform to
the evidence produced by Yantis and collaborators (section II), according to which at-
tention is directed to pre-attentive (proto)object representations. In Rensink’s theory, on
the other hand, the function of attention is to endow unstable pre-attentive proto-object
representations with greater spatiotemporal coherence. This theory will therefore be pre-
supposed as an attentional mechanism of maintenance of numerical identity.
But before this hybrid mechanism can finally be explained in more detail in sec-
tion VI, an important question remains open. According to the NON-CONCEPTUAL
constraint from section II, a mechanism of object representation must be cognitively im-
penetrable,  independent  of the application of concepts.  But attention,  as Lamme has
shown, does not meet this constraint. How, then, can the output of an attentional process
be the lowest representational level where objects first appear in the visual system? If
this  is  the case,  then this  mechanism does not  meet  NON-CONCEPTUAL, and the
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whole model is compromised.
But here we should make a distinction between a mechanism mentioning the ap-
plication of concepts in the explanation of its basic operation, and a mechanism operat-
ing simultaneously to an application of concepts that is external to it. To go back to
Levine’s  example,  the  intentionally  mediated  metasemantic  mechanism  behind  the
name ‘Julius’ mentions the application of concepts in the explanation of its basic opera-
tion, since the name refers in virtue of the conceptual content of the representation “the
inventor of the zipper.” But in Rensink’s coherence theory, the function of attention is
just to endow unstable proto-object representations with greater spatiotemporal coher-
ence, and nothing in the explanation of the basic operation of this mechanism mentions
the application of concepts. Even if at the temporal scale this mechanism operates there
are already recurrent connections with higher cognitive centers in the brain, this at most
shows that concepts may be applied to perception at the same temporal scale, but it does
not show that this application takes place through the mechanism in question. Indeed, in
Rensink’s theory attentional representations acquire greater spatiotemporal coherence
merely in virtue of entering visual short-term memory, and they can be iconic and non-
conceptual (Rensink 2000: 26). On the basis of these observations, we can reformulate
the NON-CONCEPTUAL constraint in the following terms:
• NON-CONCEPTUAL':  A perceptual  metasemantic  mechanism for demonstrative
thoughts must not mention the application of concepts in the explanation of its basic
operation. 
Thus reformulated, Rensink’s theory can now satisfy this theoretical constraint,
insofar as the function of attention is just to endow iconic proto-object representations
with  greater  spatiotemporal  coherence,  by  allowing  them to  enter  visual  short-term
memory.  This  move allows attentional  processes  to  be  incorporated  into  the  hybrid
mechanism that will be presented in the next section. It is important to notice that even
after both theoretical constraints were reformulated, the main motivation behind them
was nonetheless preserved, which is to restrict putative perceptual mechanisms to direct
and non-conceptual  metasemantic  mechanisms.  Reformulating  the two constraints  in
this manner has therefore been proven advantageous, affording more space of maneuver
without losing sight of the main motivation behind them.
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VI – Conclusion: in defense of a hybrid metasemantic mechanism for demonstra-
tive thoughts
In this paper I introduced the philosophical notion of “demonstrative thoughts”,
as cognitive activities directed at particular objects in the world, based on the visual per-
ception of these objects. One of the main functions of this terminology is to indicate that
the singular content of these thoughts is not determined satisfactionally, through the at-
tribution of descriptive material to the object, but “demonstratively”, through a percep-
tual relation between subject and object established at the time of the perception. It is
precisely because they reveal this “direct” (i.e., conceptually unmediated) relation be-
tween subject  and object  that  demonstrative  thoughts  are  philosophically  interesting
(section I).
A fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thoughts is to elucidate this
fundamental perceptual relation that puts us in a direct contact with objects in the world,
which explains how demonstrative thoughts come to have the contents the they do. I’ve
called this the metasemantic problem of demonstrative thoughts. An approach that has
become increasingly popular in the last two decades is to borrow empirical models of
visual processing from cognitive science. The basic presupposition behind this approach
is that perceptual mechanisms of object representation may help us solve the metase-
mantic problem, according to some pre-established theoretical constraints (section II).
I  then  examined  two  putative  mechanisms  in  light  of  these  theoretical  con-
straints,  starting  with  Pylyshyn’s  FINST model  (2001/2007),  as  incorporated  into  a
philosophical theory of demonstrative thoughts by Joseph Levine (2010). After arguing
that available evidence does not support the existence of this mechanism, and that the
same experimental results mat be explained by more parsimonious attentional models
(section III), I looked to an earlier level of perceptual processing, involving object seg-
mentation processes (section IV). This was Raftopoulos’ proposal to solve the mentase-
mantic problem of demonstrative thoughts (2009a,b). The proto-object representations
at this level of processing, however, were too unstable and short-lived, being incapable
of determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. One possible solution,
based on Rensink’s coherence theory of attention (2000), is to posit attention as the
process responsible for endowing these unstable representations with greater spatiotem-
poral  coherence.  Attentional  mechanisms,  however,  do not  seem to meet  the NON-
CONCEPTUAL theoretical constraint, which leads us to an impasse: either an atten-
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tional mechanism meets the first but not the second theoretical constraint, or a pre-atten-
tive mechanism meets the second but not the first.
A solution to this  impasse was found by reformulating  both theoretical  con-
straints, so as to allow a more flexible space of maneuver but without losing sight of the
main motivation behind these constraints (section V). Finally, on the basis of this refor-
mulation, and on the empirical evidence presented throughout this paper, we can pro-
pose a hybrid metasemantic mechanism that perceptually determines the singular con-
tent of demonstrative thoughts:
First of all,  pre-attentive processes of object segmentation discriminate visual
units in a visual array in a purely bottom-up manner with no representational intermedi-
aries,  connecting  mind and world  in  a  direct  and conceptually  unmediated  manner.
These units, however, are not yet object representations,  but proto-objects with very
limited spatiotemporal coherence. With the allocation of attention these representations
are endowed with greater spatiotemporal coherence by entering visual short-term mem-
ory, allowing the visual system to represent a particular object that retains its numerical
identity through time and movement during a period of observation. The result is a spa-
tiotemporally coherent perceptual representation that represents particular objects in the
world with an iconic structure in visual short-term memory.
On the basis of these perceptions, an agent can engage in a series of cognitive
activities in relation to the particular object perceived (demonstrative thoughts). In this
case, the singular content of these thoughts is determined by the perceptual relation be-
tween subject  and object  established when the  object  was first  segregated  from the
background by object segmentation processes, and the resulting representation endowed
with greater spatiotemporal coherence through attention,  allowing the agent to select
just that object in experience.
These observations lead us to conclude that Joseph Levine is basically correct in
postulating a hierarchy of three representational levels, although he is mistaken as to the
pre-attentive mechanism specified at the first level, is vague as to the attentional mecha-
nism presupposed in the intermediary level, and construes conceptual content as abstract
symbols in a language of thought, a view we need not endorse.14 We can, however, stick
14 The Language of Thought, or LOT, is a representational theory of mind developed by Jerry
Fodor (1975), where thinking consists in the manipulation of abstract symbols in a mental lan-
guage. This theory, which is assumed by Levine, remains controversial, although for reasons of
space I will not engage with it here.
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to the basic idea of a three level hierarchy as a useful schema to capture the structure
and function of each level, as well as the interactions between them. Adapted to the
present discussion, this model can be reconstructed and reinterpreted in the following
terms:
LEVEL CONTENT STRUCTURE FUNCTION












To segregate and discrimi-
nate visual units from the
background 
Property ‘F’ in the table above should be understood as a basic sensory feature,
such as ‘rectangular’ or ‘red’, that can figure in the content of perceptual representations
already at  the  lowest  pre-attentive  level.  The attentional  level  immediately  above it
refers to attended object representations that enter visual short-term memory, which re-
tain the iconic structure from the pre-attentive level but gains greater spatiotemporal co-
herence. The choice of representing the external object as x(F) is to mark a structural
isomorphism to the pre-attentive and attentional iconic representations, while simultane-
ously marking a structural difference from the conceptual representation “this is F”. 
According to Burge (2010), only conceptual contents exhibit a genuine predica-
tive structure, where the application of the predicate ‘…is F’ can be separated from the
subject ‘this’ in a way that both can be individually combined with the content of other
conceptual representations: the property ‘F’ can be applied to other objects, at the same
time that other  properties may be applied to the object that the demonstrative ‘this’
refers to.15 In perception, however, general elements (sensory features) and singular ele-
ments (object representations) are always applied together. What we perceive, in other
words, are objects bearing properties, and properties as in particular objects. These two
elements cannot be “peeled off” from one another so as to individually combine with
other representations. This non-conceptual structure, according to Burge, can be cap-
tured with a noun phrase such as ‘this x F’ (i.e., ‘this red object’), in contrast with a gen-
15 This is similar to Evans’ “generality constraint”, posited as a characteristic feature of con-
ceptual thought (1982).
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uine predicative structure like ‘this x is F’ (2010, pp. 541-4).
Burge’s proposal to structurally demarcate conceptual and non-conceptual con-
tents is compatible with the table above, where the perceptual representation x(F) marks
the inseparability of the singular element ‘x’ and the general element ‘F’. When we en-
gage in cognitive activities directed at particular objects in the world, however, the ob-
ject attentively selected in experience can be referred to with a demonstrative such as
‘this’, and one of its sensory features with the concept ‘F’. We need not, however, take
the elements ‘this’, ‘is’ and ‘F’ in the conceptual representation to be abstract symbols
in a language of thought, as Levine proposes. Rather, this predicative structure, follow-
ing Burge, serves only to capture certain cognitive abilities on the part of the subject,
where these elements can be separately combined with other conceptual representations
in the form of deliberations, suppositions, inferential reasonings, etc., as a characteristic
feature of demonstrative thoughts. The object these thoughts concern is none other than
the object represented in an iconic and non-conceptual manner by the hybrid mechanism
described above, which anchors these cognitive activities to the world.
In this manner, I hope to have showed how empirical models from cognitive
psychology may complement philosophical questions concerning the intentionality of
thought and the determination of singular mental contents. Before concluding, however,
it must be admitted that I have treated the maintenance of numerical identity question in
a simplified manner. In this paper I focused on perceptual abilities to track the spa-
tiotemporal trajectory of an object during a period of observation, but it is clear that this
question may acquire increasingly higher levels of conceptual complexity, as more so-
phisticated cognitive strategies are required to identify and reidentify an object through
space and time. This is particularly clear during longer periods of non-observation or
through substantial qualitative changes, where the capacity to maintain the numerical
identity of an object will mobilize cognitive resources that are more complex than mere
attentional abilities.
Although some philosophers have said that singular contents are only possible in
the presence of this more complex cognitive apparatus16, I see no reason to deny that
singular contents may already be available at the level of these more primitive percep-
tual abilities. In this picture, the capacity to maintain the numerical identity of an object
through space and time take place in a continuum, and is a matter of degree. It has its
16 Evans (1982), Quine (1995), Hatfield (2009), among others.
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origins  in  more  primitive  attentional  abilities  –  where  singular  contents  are  already
available to characterize the mental state of an agent who keeps track of an object of
perception – but acquires higher levels of conceptual complexity as the agent’s cogni-
tive system develops along with the kinds of challenges she faces in her external envi-
ronment. To choose one particular point or another in this continuum, where singular
contents suddenly become available, seems like an arbitrary choice to me.17 
Object segmentation processes and selective attention, which allow us to indi-
viduate and track an object during a period of observation, mark the beginnings of our
conception of the world as structured into particular objects that persist in time. When
we cognitively engage with these objects, we are exercising demonstrative thought char-
acterized by singular contents, which concern objects that have been pre-attentively seg-
regated and attentively selected.
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